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Recent Decision

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Does Not Bar
Preclearance of a Redistricting Plan Enacted with a
Discriminatory But Nonretrogressive Purpose: Reno
v. Bossier ParishSch. Bd.
FEDERAL

STATUTES

PRECLEARANCE -

-

VOTING

RIGHTS

ACT

("VRA")

-

SECTION

5

The Supreme Court of the United States held that

a covered jurisdiction under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
cannot be denied preclearance of a nonretrogressive redistricting
plan even if the plan is enacted with a discriminatory purpose.
Reno v. Bossier ParishSch. Bd., 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000).
Late in 1992, due to the change in demographics as a result of
the 1990 decennial census, the Bossier Parish School Board
("Board") adopted the same redistricting plan that the Police Jury
of Bossier Parish had drawn for its electoral districts.' The Police
Jury's plan had already been given preclearance by the Attorney
General in July of 1991.2 Just prior to the Board's adoption of the
1. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 120 S. Ct. 866, 869 (2000) ("Bossier ParishIf). The
Police Jury of Bossier Parish is the 12-member governing body of this political subdivision of
the State of Louisiana. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F Supp. 434, 437 (D.D.C. 1995).
The Board's composition reflects that of the Police Jury's. Id. at 437. Since 1980, the citizenry
in Bossier Parish had shifted considerably causing a wide variance of population distribution
among its existing districts, thus furnishing the need to redraw its electoral districts. Id. At
a public hearing, the Police Jury rejected the idea of creating any majority-black districts and
opted instead to adopt a plan prepared by its own cartographer, which provided for a fairly
even distribution of population and met incumbency concerns. Id.
2. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 869. Due to its history of discrimination in voting
practices, Bossier Parish, like all other subdivisions in the State of Louisiana, is a jurisdiction
subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA') which provides in part:
Whenever a . . . political subdivision shall enact or seek to administer any voting
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Jury's plan, George Price, the president of the local chapter of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
submitted
a plan that created majority-black
districts-'
Subsequently, in January of 1993, the Board presented its plan for
redistricting to the Attorney General. 4 After learning that the
NAACP had proposed a plan to the Board in 1992, the Attorney
General denied preclearance of the Board's plan by issuing a formal
objection.5 Upon rejection of its request for reconsideration, the
Board filed this action in the United States District Court for the
6
District of Columbia seeking preclearance.
Writing for the majority of the three-judge district court, Judge
Silberman
granted
preclearance.'
Defendants
made
two
unsuccessful claims.8 First, defendants argued that because the
Board failed to establish majority-black voting districts, it
perpetrated discriminatory voting practices in violation of section 2
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964... such State or
subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . . . [Such]
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without
such proceeding if [it] has been submitted by the ... appropriate official of such State
or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed
an objection within sixty days after such submission, or . . . has affirmatively
indicated that such objection will not be made ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
3. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 869. George Price was the appellant-intervenor in this
case. Id. Price's redistricting plan called for the creation of two majority-black districts, but
also necessitated the splitting of 46 precincts. Bossier Parish, 907 F Supp. at 438-39.
Intervenor's witness testified that the most precincts that he ever split was eight. Id. at 439.
4. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 869. Since 1964, the Board has been a defendant in
Lemon v. Bossier ParishSch. Bd., Civ. Act. No. 10,687 (W.D. La, filed Dec. 2, 1964). Bossier
Parish, 907 F Supp. at 437 n.2. Lemon was instituted to pursue the desegregation of the
district's schools. Id. at 438. The Board's motion for declaration of unitary status and release
from ongoing court supervision was denied in 1979. Id.
5. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 869. The "new information" the Attorney General
relied upon was the plan submitted by Price that asserted that the black population was
sufficiently compact to legitimize the creation of two majority-black districts. Id.
6. Id. Section 5 of the VRA allows for judicial preclearance of a proposed voting
change, independent of the Attorney General's administrative decision, as long as the change
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
7. Bossier Parish, 907 F Supp. at 437. By agreement of the parties, the case was
heard by a single judge of the panel with the record of that proceeding provided to the
remainder of the panel. Id. at 439-40. However, closing argument was before the entire
panel. Id. at 440.
8. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 869-70.
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of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA")Y Second, defendants argued that
the Board's plan violated section 5 of the VRA because it was
instituted with a discriminatory purpose even though it had no
retrogressive effect.10 The district court disposed of the first
contention by stating that denial of preclearance was not proper
even if the Board's actions violated Section 2." Next, Judge
Silberman dismissed the defendant's second contention by
remarking that, because the plan was passed for at least two
legitimate purposes, the Board had met its burden of proof. 12 The
13
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Writing for the majority of the United States Supreme Court,
9. Id. at 869. Section 2 of the VRA states in part: "No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1973a.

10. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 869. Because the Board's plan would not deteriorate
any rights of minority voters, defendants stipulated before the district court that the plan did
not have a prohibited "effect" under section 5. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)
(explaining that the purpose of section 5 has always been to ensure that any change in
voting procedure does not retrogress the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of voting rights they currently enjoy).
11. Bossier Parish, 907 F Supp. at 445. The district court relied upon Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), for the maxim "section 2 and its standards have no place in a
section 5 preclearance action." Bossier Parish,907 F Supp. at 445.
12. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 870. In a section 5 case, the burden of proving that
the suggested change has a nondiscriminatory purpose as well as a nondiscriminatory effect
rests on the party petitioning for preclearance. See Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156
(1980) (holding that the burden of proving a nondiscriminatory purpose and effect rests on
the city in a section 5 situation). The district court discussed the differences between the
burden shifting technique employed by courts in a section 2 case as opposed to a section 5
case. Bossier Parish,907 F. Supp. at 446. In a section 2 case, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case that the act objected to leads to a dilution in voting strength.
Id. at 446. The burden then shifts to the political entity to dispute that allegation and to
show that the result of the act does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. See Hall v.
Holder, 955 F2d 1563 (11t Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); and
Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F2d 1012 (11"h Cir. 1990). On the other hand, in a section 5
case the burden of proof rests upon the political subdivision seeking preclearance to
establish that the proposed voting change does not have a retrogressive effect or
discriminatory purpose. Bossier Parish, 907 F. Supp. at 446. Once this prima facie case is
established, preclearance will be granted unless the case is successfully rebutted by the
defendant. See Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994); McCain v.
Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984); and Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975). In the
instant case, the Board proffered many reasons for adopting the Police Jury's plan, at least
two of which the district court found legitimate. Bossier Parish, 907 F Supp. at 447. First,
they believed that the plan would be guaranteed swift preclearance, and, second, the Board
believed that the plan would not entail the redrawing of any precinct lines. Id.
13. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 870. In a section 5 action that is heard by a three
judge panel, the appeal is directly to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See also 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (requiring the convening of a three-judge court for any action challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of any statewide legislative body).
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Justice O'Connor asserted that even though proof of a section 2
violation, in and of itself, may not be sufficient to establish that a
plan was enacted with a prohibited section 5 retrogressive purpose,
section 2 evidence of vote dilution may, nevertheless, be relevant in
making that determination. 4 Therefore, the Supreme Court rejected
the district court's postulation that it would not consider any
section 2 evidence in determining whether it could be used to
prove a "discriminatory intent to retrogress purpose" prohibited by
section 5.15 Because it was uncertain whether the district court had
considered any section 2 evidence in making its determination, the
Supreme Court vacated that portion of the district court's decision
and remanded with instructions to apply the test developed in
16
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
Additionally, the majority left open the question of whether a
section 5 purpose inquiry should ever extend beyond the search for
retrogressive intent and instructed the district court to address the
17
issue on remand.
14. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1997) ("Bossier Parish F).
The Court examined the concept of "relevant" evidence as articulated under Federal Rule of
Evidence 401. Id. at 487. " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EviD. 401. Here, the
Court explains that by using the concept of relevance as set forth in the rule, action taken
by a political entity is often probative of why the action was taken, i.e., "people usually
intend the natural consequences of their actions." Bossier Parish,520 U.S. at 487. Thus, the
Court concluded that the dilutive impact of a plan would make it more probable than not
that the reason for its adoption was an intent to retrogress. Id.
15. Bossier Parish,520 U.S. at 486.
16. Id. at 488-90. On remand, the Court wanted to make sure that the district court did
not disregard any evidence of dilutive impact that may bear upon whether or not the Board
acted with a retrogressive intent. Id. at 489-90. The Supreme Court acknowledged that
evaluating the motives of a political entity was a difficult task and, therefore, ordered the
district court to apply the reasoning of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977). Id. at 488. Under the Arlington Heights test, several factors are
considered in determining whether a political subdivision acted with an "invidious
discriminatory purpose." Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 488. First, a court should look at
whether the impact of an official action "bears more heavily on one race than another." Id.
at 489.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that although
disproportionate impact is relevant, it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution). The list of other factors includes the
"historical background of the Uurisdiction's] decision," the "sequence of events leading up to
the challenged decision," any deviation from normal procedures, and any "legislative or
administrative history, especially . . . [any] contemporary statements by members of the
decision-making body." Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 489.
17. Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 486. The Court declined to address this question
because it was unnecessary to the result reached in their decision to remand. Id. at 486; see
also Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 n.5 (1989) (declining to
decide an issue unnecessary to the decision). In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated he would
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On remand, the district court once again granted preclearance.18
In an opinion authored by Judge Robertson, the district court
declined to answer the question left open by the Supreme Court in
Bossier Parish 1.19 The district court then analyzed the evidence
before it in light of the Arlington Heights standard enunciated by
the Supreme Court, particularly as it applied to the relationship
between any dilutive impact of the Board's plan and whether or not
those findings showed that the Board acted with a retrogressive
intent. 20 Deciding that the record before it did not support the
allegations of dilutive impact and discriminatory purpose under the
Arlington Heights test, the court held that the required evidentiary
threshold for establishing retrogressive intent in this case was not
met.21 Probable jurisdiction was once again noted by the Supreme
not limit the section 5 inquiry to evidence that may be probative of "intent to retrogress."
Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 507. He believed that, consistent with the Voting Rights Act, a
discriminatory purpose may be found regardless of whether there was any intent to
retrogress and, thus, violate Section 5. Id. at 507-08.
18. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29, 30 (1998). Although supplemental
briefs were filed, no additional evidence was submitted by agreement of the parties. Id. at
30. Nevertheless, the Board asked the Court to take judicial notice of the 1990 school board
election results in which a black board member was elected out of a white-majority district.
Id. The Court refused the request. Id. Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Bossier
Parish II, noted that, even though this evidence is not part of the record, it illustrates that
federal intervention is unnecessary. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 878.
19. BossierParish, 7 F Supp. 2d at 31. It was unclear to the district court whether it
should answer the question regarding the scope of a section 5 inquiry, especially as to
whether it extends beyond the inquiry of retrogressive intent. Id. In any event, the court's
refusal to answer the question was based upon a record that did not go beyond the
"presence or absence of retrogressive intent." Id. Indeed, it said that it could "imagine a set
of facts that would establish a 'non-retrogressive, but nevertheless discriminatory purpose,'
but those imagined facts are not present here." Id.
20. Id. at 31-32. Thus, the district court's scrutiny in this case centered upon "whether
the record disproves Bossier Parish's retrogressive intent in adopting the Jury plan." Id. at
31. The centerpiece of this litigation revolved around the meaning of retrogression in
conjunction with section 5 of the VRA, which the district court defined as comparing the
political subdivision's recently adopted voting plan with the plan already in place. Id.; see
Bossier Parish,520 U.S. at 478 (using the existing plan as the "benchmark" from which to
measure change). Defendant-Intervenor argued that searching for retrogression in a voting
district that has never elected a black representative is untenable because it is "impossible to
retrogress from zero." Bossier Parish,7 F Supp. 2d at 31. The district court rejected that
position by asserting that it is quite possible to further dilute voting rights aside from looking
strictly at election results. Id. See also Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (concluding that a new
apportionment could so discriminate on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution).
21. Bossier Parish, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 31-32. Under the first factor of the Arlington
Heights test, which focuses upon whether official action "bears more heavily on one race
than another," defendant-intervenor referred to several items in the Board's plan that he
considered to have a dilutive impact. Id. Two of these allegations were "failure to respect
communities of interest" and "cutting across attendance boundaries." Id. at 32. These
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22

The Board challenged the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on
the basis of mootness because new data will be available from the
2000 decennial census, and the next scheduled election is not until
2002.23 In response, appellants set forth various reasons why the

disputed plan must be litigated.24 Justice Scalia, speaking for the
Court, declared that it was necessary to determine whether
preclearance was properly granted because the 1992 plan, in all
25
likelihood, would have a continuing effect.

In addressing the merits, the Court narrowed the issue to
whether "section 5 of the VRA prohibits preclearance of a
factors might establish a retrogressive purpose, the district court went on to say, if there
was any corroborating evidence of a deliberate attempt to break up the voting blocks to
divide the black vote. Id. The second factor that the district court analyzed was the
historical background surrounding the Board's voting plan. Id. The district court discussed
the past history of Bossier Parish relating to desegregation measures and adherence to a
unitary school system. Id. See Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F Supp. 709 (W.D. La.
1965), aff'd, 370 F2d 847 (5 th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967) (affirming an
injunction issued by the district court ordering the school authorities to submit a
desegregation plan for Bossier public schools). The conclusion that the district court
reached is that, at best, the evidence only proved an intent "to maintain the status quo," and
"is not enough to rebut the School Board's prima facie showing that it did not intend
retrogression." Bossier Parish, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 32. The remaining factors of the Arlington
Heights test were disposed of briefly by a showing that, although the Board did not embrace
improving the position of racial minorities in its voting district or that it did not adopt the
NAACP's plan, these conclusions did not establish that the Board acted with retrogressive
intent. Id. at 32.
22. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 525 U.S. 1118 (1999). A jurisdiction clause, also
termed a jurisdictional statement, is "[a]t law, a statement in a pleading that sets forth the
court's jurisdiction to act in the case." BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY 858 (7 th ed. 1999). Appellants,
in submitting their jurisdictional statements, did not dispute the district court's holding that
the evidence was insufficient to establish retrogressive intent; however, they did contest as
erroneous the district court's "conclusion that there was no evidence of discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose." Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 870. Also asserted by appellants was
the proposition that any redistricting plan proposed with a discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose should be denied preclearance under section 5 of the VRA. Id.
23. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 871. The federal courts are not permitted to render
advisory opinions under Article III of the United States Constitution which authorizes
jurisdiction only when there is a live "case or controversy." Id. The Board asserted that it
will be required to implement a new redistricting plan based upon the information from the
2000 census, thus rendering the plan at issue of no consequence. Id.
24. Id. Appellants maintained that theoretically, upon the death or resignation of one of
the Board members before the next election or a failure to devise a new plan for the 2002
election, the Board would need to have an approved plan in place. Id. Additionally,
appellants hoped that if the Court were to hold that the voting plan was granted
preclearance erroneously, they could file for an injunction and possibly have a special
election ordered. Id.
25. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the 1992 plan will be the "baseline" by which the
future plan is measured absent a subsequent section 2 challenge. Id.
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redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose."26 This question was answered in the
negative because the Court reasoned that the language in the
section 5 "effect" prong, which has long been held to apply to
retrogressive dilution only, should also apply to the "purpose"
prong of section 5.27
Justice Scalia began the Court's analysis by explaining that a
covered jurisdiction under section 5 of the VRA must satisfy two
distinct elements before preclearance will be granted to a proposed
voting plan.28 The contemplated change must not only "not have the
purpose... of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color" but also it must "not have the effect of denying or
29
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."
Additionally, the Court held that the burden of persuasion
30
regarding these two elements lies with the covered jurisdiction.
Next, the Court explained its holding in Beer v. United States3'
as it pertains to the effect prong of section 5.32 The Beer Court
concluded that any reapportionment scheme that improved the
position of the minority voter certainly does not have "the 'effect'
of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within
the meaning of section 5."33 Consequently, the Court explained that
in a vote-dilution claim, "effect" only refers to retrogressive
effects.'4
Appellants argued that not withstanding the fact that the phrase
"abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" refers to
retrogressive "effects," the same phrase as applied to "purpose"
refers to general discrimination only in section 5 claims.35 The
26. Id. Appellants raised an additional claim disputing the district court's findings of
fact that "there was no evidence of discriminatory but nonretrogressive intent." Id. This issue
was resolved by the Court's holding in this case. Id.
27. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 871.
28. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. See Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 478 (stating that the burden of proof is on the
jurisdiction seeking preclearance).
31. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
32. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 872. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (concluding that an
ameliorative plan does not have the "effect" of vote dilution within the meaning of section
5).
33. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 872 (citing Beer, 425 U.S. at 141).
34. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 872.
35. Id. at 872. Justice Scalia illustrated in an algebraic expression what he considered
to be the flawed reasoning advanced by appellants by remarking that the phrase "does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of x" would be changed to "does not have the
purpose of y and will not have the effect of x." Id.
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Court declined to accept this argument because it refused to apply
different meanings to the same phrase based upon the term it is
modifying. 36 Nonetheless, appellants directed the Court to its
decision in Richmond v. United States37 in an attempt to show that
in some section 5 cases, the Court has given the "purpose" prong a
"broader meaning than the effect prong."38 Justice Scalia
distinguished Richmond based upon the peculiar nature of
annexation disputes.3 9 Acknowledging that Richmond did indeed
adopt different meanings for the "effect" and "purpose" prongs,
Justice Scalia stated that this was necessary in the unique area of
annexation in order to prevent otherwise routine annexations from
being declared violative of section 5.40 Consequently, the Court
41
found this argument to be inapplicable to the issue at hand.
Appellants next line of attack was to contend that unless
different meanings were assigned to the purpose and effect prongs,
the purpose prong, as it relates to section 5, would be a "trivial
matter."42 In refusing to embrace this prediction, Justice Scalia
36. Id. See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 129 (1983) (declining to
give different meanings to the phrase "other than" when it modified "banks" and "common
carriers" in the same clause).
37. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
38. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 872. Richmond was an annexation dispute where it
was argued that the annexation had the effect of lowering the percentage of blacks in the
community. Id.
39. Id. Although annexation cases invoke the necessity of gaining preclearance by a
covered jurisdiction under section 5 of the VRA, the Court ruled that the baseline for
measuring retrogression does not remain stagnant, but it changes to consider whether the
political unit created after the annexation fairly reflects the percentage of blacks in the new
unit. Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371. Thus, a post-annexation "retrogression" may not be a
retrogression for section 5 purposes if the post-annexation voting percentage of blacks does
not retrogress. Id. at 371.
40. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 872-73. Even when the percentage reduction in the
black population is reduced in annexation, the fact that the jurisdiction's actions had a
"retrogressive effect" does not automatically require a denial of preclearance of the
annexation. Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371. On the other hand, the Court did not make any
exception to the "purpose" prong of section 5. Id. at 378-79. Preclearance could still be
denied when a jurisdiction acted with the purpose of reducing the percentage of blacks in
the population. Id.
41. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 873. Justice Scalia emphasized that Richmond does
not stand for the axiom that the purpose and effect prongs of section 5 cases have
fundamentally different meanings; i.e., in routine reapportionment cases, the purpose prong
requires retrogression in the same manner as the effect prong before section 5 is violated.
Id.
42. Id. Both the Appellant Price and the Federal Appellant made this argument in their
briefs for reargument. Appellant Price's Brief on Reargument at 13, Reno v. Bossier Parish,
No. 98-405, 98-406, 1999 WL 133908 (March 5, 1999); Appellant Price's Reply Brief on
Reargument at 3, Reno v. Bossier Parish,No. 98-405, 98-406, 1999 WL 238998 (Apr. 16, 1999);
and Federal Appellant's Reply Brief on Reargument at 9, Reno v. Bossier Parish, No. 98-405,
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admonished the appellants for their failure "to cite at least some
instances" in which the Court has construed "the innumerable
statutes barring conduct with a particular 'purpose or effect' " to
have entirely different meanings as those terms are used.4 The
Court illustrated that the "purpose" prong has "value and effect" by
showing that when a statute having "the purpose or effect of x" is
enacted, the government only has to demonstrate that the disputed
action has "the purpose of x" to succeed.M The Court noted that
this advantage alone was sufficient to warrant the inclusion of the
45
purpose prong into section 5 of the VRA.

Turning again to its holding in Beer, Justice Scalia rejected
appellants' contention that the phrase "abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color" in section 5 should not be limited to
retrogression. 46 To demonstrate what it considered to be the fallacy
in appellants' argument, the Court remarked that the term "abridge"
means "shorten" according to its normal, ordinary usage in
language and, thus, involves by necessity a comparison. 47 Therefore,
the Court reasoned that, due to the unique nature of section 5
preclearance procedures that only consider changes to existing
voting practices, such practices form "the baseline" or "the status
quo that is proposed to be changed."48 As a consequence, the Court
98-406, 1999 WL 239005 (Apr. 16, 1999).
43. Id. Justice Scalia cites several examples of statutes which incorporate "purpose"
and "effect" language, including 7 U.S.C. § 192(d); 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(1)(A); and 47 U.S.C. §
541(b)(3)(B) (1994 ed., Supp. lII). Bossier Parish, 120 S.Ct. at 873.
44. Id. at 873-74.
45. Id. Proving actual retrogressive effect in vote dilution cases often proves to be an
intricate task which is made somewhat less difficult by attaching the "purpose" prong to the
statute. Id.
46. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 873-74. In their reply brief for reargument, federal
appellants point to language in other parts of the VRA as well as the Fifteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution that parallels section 5 language. For example, section 2 of
the VRA provides that "No voting [practice] shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color . . . ." The Fifteenth
Amendment provides that "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 874 (citing the VRA and the
Fifteenth Amendment).
47. Id. at 874. (citing WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 7 (2d ed. 1950);
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 6 (3d ed. 1992)). Id.

48. Id. The Court ruled that appellants' attempt to incorporate general section 2
proceedings or actions involving the Fifteenth Amendment with the unique enforcement
provision of section 5 failed to consider the fundamental difference between the two
sections. Id. at 874-75. For example, the Court explained that in a section 2 proceeding or a
constitutional challenge to an alleged abridgement of a voting practice, the issue is not a
comparison of the new practice with the old one, but whether the new practice is an
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ruled that the proposed changes must not abridge (or "shorten")
the status quo or preclearance will be denied. 49 Thus, as a result of
the Court's ratiocination, the practical result of a preclearance
denial in a section 5 proceeding is that the status quo, even if
already "discriminatory," remains in effect.50 Consequently, the
Court held that a voting change that has an "ameliorative effect"
but, nevertheless, is enacted with a discriminatory nonretrogressive
purpose, should not be denied preclearance because such a denial
leaves the discriminatory status quo in place and the voters no
better off than before the change."
"abridgement" of voting power in comparison to what the "hypothetical" voting alternative
"ought to be." Id. at 874.
49. Id. In contrast, the Court explained that the purpose of section 5 of the VRA is to
prevent retrogression of voting practices already in place in the covered jurisdictions by
requiring preclearance of any proposed voting changes. Id. at 875. The preclearance of a
voting change does not mean "approval" as such by the body granting it, only that the
change is not any more "dilutive than what it replaces." Id. Thus, any attack on the voting
change itself must take place through the means of a section 2 action which could be
initiated in a subsequent proceeding in the challenger's district. Id.
50. Id. at 875.
51. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 875-76. At oral argument Michael A. Carvin, attorney
for appellee, illustrated this concept with the following hypothetical:
MR. CARVIN: Right, but if they had a law that said no one could vote, that would
violate the Voting Rights Act because it would be a test or device, wholly apart from
section 5. It would also violate section 5, because it denied the right to vote,
regardless of whether abridge means retrogression or not.
But let's play out your hypothetical. A Mississippi jurisdiction has a law that says no
one can vote. All section 5 said under South Carolinav. Katzenbach was, look, don't
make your other voting procedures worse to replace the law we have just gotten rid
of.
If those procedures stay the same, if the registration hours and all of the
registration qualifications stayed the same, and after all, they were designed for an
all-white electorate, then you haven't filled the discriminatory gap that's left when the
Voting Rights Act itself eliminates the law that says blacks can't vote, so that's a
perfect example of what I'm talking about.
You've got a law that says, blacks can't vote. Then the jurisdiction comes along and
says, look, we're going to increase filing fees for candidates, because now blacks can
vote, we want to make sure they don't get to run for office.
Now, let's assume they reduce the filing fee, so it was retrogressive, from $100 to
$75, but the NAACP says, you should have reduced it to $50, and you find that the
failure to reduce the filing fee to $50 was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, what
would you do under section 5? You would deny the reduction of the filing fee to $75.
You would put back in place the filing fee of $100, the fee that was worse for black
candidates.
And Congress understood that since the remedy under section 5 is to deny the
change and restore the status quo, you only want to deny the change when it's worse
than the status quo. You never want to deny the change when it's better than the
status quo, i.e., nonretrogressive, because then you'd go back to the discriminatory
status quo.
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., Nos. 98-405, 98-406, 1999 WL 966660, at *23, *24
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Furthermore, the Court contended that if the lines were to be
blurred between section 2 and section 5 proceedings, which is what
the Court refused to do in Bossier Parish I, it would "exacerbate
the 'substantial' federalism costs that the preclearance procedure
already exacts." 52 The majority also rejected Justice Souter's
assertion that the Court should give deference to the Justice
Department's "longstanding practice" of refusing to grant
preclearance to voting changes that it feels have an
"unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose."5
Next, Justice Scalia addressed appellants' assertion that the
Court had previously held, in Beer as well as in Pleasant Grove v.
United States, 4 that section 5 "extends to discriminatory but
nonretrogressive intent."55 The Justice noted that the statement in
Beer that was quoted by the appellants in support of this claim was
purely dictum.56 Emphasizing the rationale already enunciated, the
(U.S.Oral.Arg. Oct. 6, 1999).
52. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 876. Section 5 preclearance procedures have been
upheld as a necessary and constitutional response under the Fifteenth Amendment to the
practice of some States devising discriminatory voting practices intended to stay one step
ahead of adverse federal court decrees. Miller, 515 U.S. at 926 (citing South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966)). Nevertheless, any extension of Congress' authority
under the Fifteenth Amendment must "be consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution." Miller, 515 U.S. at 926 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326).
53. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 876 n.5. The Justice Department has also interpreted
section 5 as not limiting the effects prong of section 5 to retrogressive voting changes. Id.
Justice Scalia argued that the Justice Department's interpretation was rejected in Beer, and
especially deserved no deference here as the outcome of the case depended upon not only
the Court's prior reasoning in Beer, but also the "raw interpretation of the statute." Bossier
Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 876 n.5.
54. 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
55. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 876. Appellants contended that in Beer the Court
stated that "an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate section 5 unless the
apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution." Id. (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141). This, appellants stated, supports their
claim that even though legislation is enacted with a discriminatory nonretrogressive dilutive
purpose, preclearance should nevertheless be denied because of the unconstitutionality of
the act. Id. In PleasantGrove, appellants asserted that preclearance was denied on the basis
of a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose to a covered jurisdiction in an annexation
dispute, when it was impossible for the results of the annexation to retrogress the rights of
black voters because there were no black voters in the jurisdiction at the time of
annexation. Id. at 877-78 (citing PleasantGrove, 479 U.S. at 465).
56. Id. at 877. Obiter dictum is defined as follows:
The word [dictum] is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, "a
remark by the way;" that is, an observation or remark made by a judge in
pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application
of law, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily
involved in the case or essential to its determination; any statement of the law
enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, or
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Court made clear its position that section 2 proceedings are
intended to determine the constitutionality of apportionment
schemes, while section 5 proceedings are meant to address
preclearance of apportionment schemes.57 Consequently, although a
jurisdiction could be precleared to enact an "unconstitutionally
dilutive redistricting plan," the Court's holding does not leave the
aggrieved party without a remedy.-8 Finally, the Supreme Court
distinguished its holding in Pleasant Grove by explaining that the
case "did not hold that the purpose prong of section 5 extends
beyond retrogression," but only that it was possible for a
jurisdiction to enact a plan that would have a retrogressive effect
at sometime in the future. 9 Concluding that section 5 of the VRA
"does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with
a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose," the Supreme Court
60
affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Justice Thomas filed a brief concurrence and noted that,
although not part of the record, three blacks had been elected to
the School Board from majority white districts during the course of
the litigation. 61 In his opinion, this fact dispelled the need for any
federal intervention.62 Justice Souter filed an opinion, concurring in
suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or
legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in
hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. Dicta are opinions of a
judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made
without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate
determinations of the judge himself.
BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY 1100 (7" ed. 1999).
In Beer, the Court said that there was no question as to whether the proposed
reapportionment at issue was unconstitutional. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 877 (citing
Beer, 425 U.S. at 142). Furthermore, the Court stated that the dictum in Beer has never
actually been applied to deny preclearance. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 877 (citing Bossier
Parish I, 520 U.S. at 481; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 912 (1996); and Miler 515 U.S. at
924).
57. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 877.
58. Id. "Once the State has successfully complied with the section 5 approval
requirements, private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment only in
traditional suits attacking its constitutionality .
"
Id. (quoting Allen v. State Bd. Of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 549-50 (1969)). Also, "[N]either administrative nor judicial
preclearance 'shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement' of [a change in voting
practice]." Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 654 (1993)).
59. Id. at 878. The city's argument in that case was that an "impermissible purpose
under section 5 can relate only to present circumstances." Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove, 479
U.S. at 471).
60. Id.
61. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. Bossier Parish,120 S.Ct. at 878 (Thomas, J., concurring). On remand from Bossier
Parish I, the parties agreed not to supplement the record with new evidence, although
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part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined.6 Justice Souter began his
dissent by stating that Beer was wrongly decided.r Although he
refused to overrule Beer out of respect for the doctrine of stare
decisis, he declared that he would not extend its holding to the
facts of this case. 65 Consequently, the Justice undertook an
extensive examination of the facts surrounding the School Board's
adoption of the Police Jury's plan not only because of his position
additional briefs were filed. Bossier Parish, 7 F Supp. 2d at 30. Nevertheless, the school
board asked the district court to take judicial notice of the school board election results that
took place subsequent to the district court's original decision, which the district court
refused to do. Id. at 30. In footnote nine of his concurring opinion, Justice Souter expressed
his disagreement with Justice Thomas' recognition of the election results stating that those
results are irrelevant as they are outside the record. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 886 n.9
(Souter, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 878 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court's opinion
was unanimous in respect to Part II (relating to the jurisdictional challenge on the basis of
mootness), while Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas joined Parts I (setting forth the procedural posture of the case), I (construing the
provisions of section 5 and related case law), and IV (addressing appellants' contention that
prior case law supports denial of preclearance). Id. at 868.
64. Id. at 879 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
agreed that Beer held that "the only anticipated redistricting effect sufficient to bar
preclearance is retrogression in minority voting strength, however dilutive of minority voting
power a redistricting plan may otherwise be." Id. Nonetheless, Justice Souter stated that the
fact that the majority's decision places the purpose prong of section 5 on the same level that
Beer placed the effect prong, only amplifies the error in Beer. Id.
65. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Stare decisis is defined as follows:
Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. Doctrine that,
when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same.
Under doctrine a deliberate or solemn decision of court made after argument on
question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an
authority, or binding precedent in the same court, or in other courts of equal or lower
rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy. Doctrine is one
of policy, grounded on theory that security and certainty require that accepted and
established legal principle, under which rights may accrue, be recognized and
followed, though later found not to be legally sound, but whether previous holding of
court shall be adhered to, modified, or overruled is within court's discretion under
circumstances of case before it. Under doctrine, when point of law has been settled
by decision, it forms precedent which is not afterwards to be departed from, and,
while it should ordinarily be strictly adhered to, there are occasions when departure is
rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued
injustice. The doctrine is not ordinarily departed from where decision is of
long-standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public
policy demand it. The doctrine is limited to actual determinations in respect to
litigated and necessarily decided questions, and is not applicable to dicta or obiter
dicta.
BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 1414 (7t ed. 1999).
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that Beer was wrongly decided, but also because of his conviction
that Congress did not intend that section 5 would permit the
preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory
66
purpose whether it was nonretrogressive or not.
Justice Souter began by analyzing the Arlington Heights method
for determining whether discriminatory intent can be inferred from
the record.6 7 Next, he took a critical look at the disputed issues
that the district court resolved in favor of the school board as well
as those matters in the record that went undisputed. 68 One factor
the Justice seized upon to show discriminatory intent was that the
Police Jury plan included no black-majority districts. 69 He also
noted that the plan divided particular "neighboring black
communities" that shared certain commonalities which, in turn, not
only prevented "the creation of a black-majority district," but also
70
caused a dilution in the black vote.
Moreover, even though the district court found that evidence of
discriminatory intent was "too theoretical, and too attenuated" to
be designated as retrogressive, Justice Souter thought that evidence
of a general intent to dilute was significant enough to deny
preclearance. 71 Additionally, Justice Souter found that the district
66. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 879 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 879 (Souter, J., dissenting). The district court was instructed to apply the
Arlington Heights factors on remand from Bossier Parish I. Bossier Parish,520 U.S. at 488.
Justice Souter considered it crucial to take an in-depth look at the record to illustrate why
the purpose prong of section 5 should not be construed in the manner the majority has
decided. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 879. First, he pointed to the school board's admission
in plaintiffs brief on remand that the Police Jury plan diluted minority voting strength and,
thus, discriminated against the voting rights of the minority. Id. at 880. Next, the Justice
explored the history of the school board's failure to effectuate a unitary school system, and
the fact that it remains under court supervision up to this day. Id. at 880-81. In addition,
specific events surrounding the school board's adoption of the Police Jury's plan were
scrutinized, particularly the board's waiting until the NAACP proposed its plan before
submitting the Police Jury's plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. Id. at 881-82.
68. Id. at 882 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart pointed to the case of Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), to illustrate that there are three conditions that must be met
before a jurisdiction can be called upon to draw majority-minority districts so that the
playing field is leveled for minority voters. Id. First, "the minority group must be able to
demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district." Id. (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50). "Second, the minority
group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive." Id. (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S.
at 51). "Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it - in the absence of special circumstances, such as the
minority candidate running unopposed . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate." Id. (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 51).
70. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting). The record showed that some districts were
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court's reliance on Miller v. Johnson72 was misplaced because
Bossier Parish's refusal to consider creating a black-majority
district at all showed a discriminatory intent that the Miller court
did not address. 73 Justice Souter also rejected the board's argument,
and the district court's acceptance, that the board had "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons" for adopting the Police Jury's plan.74
Justice Souter concluded, therefore, that if section 5 preclearance
turns upon "dilutive but nonretrogressive intent," preclearance in
75
this case was not justified.
Justice Souter continued his analysis by arguing that the meaning
of section 5 should be read to parallel the meaning of the language
of the Fifteenth Amendment. 6 Thus, he would associate the term
"abridgement" as a concept which denotes vote dilution. 77 As a
created that had no schools at all. Id. In addition, "the plan ignores attendance
boundaries . . . does not respect communities of interest... there is one outlandishly large
district... several of them are not compact.., there is a lack of contiguity, and.., the
population deviations resulting from the jury plan are greater than the limits ( 5%) imposed
by Louisiana law." Id. (quoting Bossier Parish,7 F. Supp. 2d at 32).
72. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
73. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter averred that
Miller is inapposite because the question there was whether Georgia's failure to create a
third majority-black district, thus maximizing the number of majority-black districts it could
have constructed, betrayed a discriminatory intent, even though Georgia's plan was
admittedly ameliorative. Id. at 885.
74. Id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting). Here, the dissent referred to its previous
discussion of the Board's refusal to consider the NAACP plan because it required numerous
precinct splits. Id. "Splitting precincts only became an insuperable obstacle once the
NAACP made its proposal to create black-majority districts" Id. at 884. According to the
dissent, the other "reason" given by the Board for adopting the Police Jury plan, that it was
a "safe harbor," was implausible because although the plan could have been adopted at any
time after it was precleared by the Attorney General, it was not until the NAACP began to
pressure the Board, that the plan became appealing. Id. at 885-86.
75. Id. at 886 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justice based this conclusion on the fact that
because the jurisdiction seeking preclearance has the burden of negating intent, the Board
must lose because the record is replete with evidence of nonretrogressive discriminatory
intent on the part of the Board. Id. at 886-87.
76. Id. at 887 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent's justification for this assertion is that
the VRA is "an exercise of congressional power under section 2 of [the Fifteenth]
Amendment." Id. (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325-27). Likewise, by the use of similar
language in section 5, "Any construction of the statute, therefore, carries an implication
about the meaning of the Amendment, absent some good reason to treat the parallel texts
differently on some particular point, and a reading of the statute that would not fit the
Constitution is presumptively wrong." Id.
77. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). "Abridgement" is said to be "a condition in between
complete denial, on the one hand, and complete enjoyment of voting power, on the other."
Id. Vote dilution is a "regime that denies to minority voters the same opportunity to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice that majority
voters enjoy." Id. Vote dilution also refers to retrogressive voting schemes that lessen a
voter's participation in the voting process from a prior enacted plan. Id. at 888. Although
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result, the Justice would not have restricted vote dilution to claims
of retrogression because the Fifteenth Amendment does not do so,
because section 5 is free of any limiting terms, and finally because
no cases, except for Beer, hold that voting abridgement applies
exclusively to retrogressive dilution.7 Justice Souter asserted that
the fact that section 5 does not apply until a change in voting
procedures is proposed does not make the previous practice the
79
benchmark that the new standard is measured against.
In sum, the dissent contended that to give the purpose prong the
broader connotation that the Fifteenth Amendment seems to
suggest would not only be simple to apply, but would also be more
harmonious with prior case law.80 In particular, the dissent
concluded that the Richmond case, that was distinguished by the
majority,
makes clear that "underevaluation"
and
cases that have arisen concerning vote dilution have been litigated solely under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Justice saw no reason why the Fifteenth Amendment would not
apply equally as well. Id. (citing Shaw, 509 U.S. at 645) (also citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 84 (1980) (suggesting that the Mobile plurality said that the Fifteenth Amendment
does not reach vote dilution)).
78. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 888 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that
under the Fifteenth Amendment, restricting vote dilution to retrogressive behavior would
have been no help to newly emancipated individuals as a guarantee that their voting power,
which was nonexistent, would not be further reduced. Id. The objective of Congress
according to the dissent was to eradicate discrimination, not to perpetuate it by the
enactment of various schemes that are discriminatory, yet nonretrogressive. Id. at 889.
Justice Souter stated that the majority in the Beer court took one "statement from a House
Report" out of context which said "that section 5 would prevent covered jurisdictions from
'undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently won' by blacks." Id. at 890 (citing Beer, 425 U.S.
at 140).
79. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 889 (Souter, J., dissenting). Contrary to the majority's
view, Justice Souter stated that Congress could have mandated that a new voting plan must
pass constitutional muster under the parallel language of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. The
majority's case turned upon extending to the purpose prong of section 5 the same meaning
Beer gave to the effect prong. Id. The dissent made a detailed inquiry into the legislative
history surrounding the passage of the Voting Rights Act and its subsequent amendments to
show that the preclearance requirement of section 5 "was not enacted to authorize covered
jurisdictions to pour old poison into new bottles." Id. at 890-91.
80. Id. at 892-93 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent here stated that "[a] purpose to
dilute simply means to subordinate minority voting power," regardless of the merits of the
"existing system." Id. at 892. Justice Souter pointed to the Justice Department's longstanding
practice of refusing preclearance to plans it calculates are designed with a discriminatory
purpose. Id. (citing Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 39 (1978) ("Given
the central role of the Attorney General in formulating and implementing section 5, this
interpretation of its scope is entitled to particular deference."); United States v. Sheffield Bd.
of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1978) ("In recognition of the Attorney General's key role in
the formulation of the Act, this Court in the past has given great deference to his
interpretations of it."); and Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1971) ("This Court
shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration.") (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).

2001

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board

"underrepresentation" refer to standard principles of interpretation
under the Fifteenth Amendment and not to an "annexation
exception." 81 Finally, Justice Souter asserted that the majority's
reliance on PleasantGrove is particularly untenable because in that
case there could not have been any intent to retrogress "because
no one knew of any minority voting strength from which
retrogression would be possible."82
Justice Stevens authored a short dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, stating that he would defer to the Justice
Department's construction of the statute. 83 Furthermore, he believed
that even though the phrase "will not have the effect" can be read
as a comparison as to what is now and what will be, the phrase
"does not have the purpose" denotes no such meaning. 84 Thus, he
explained that the holding in Beer need not be disturbed, and
suggested that the Department of Justice's longstanding
85
interpretation of section 5 should be followed.
Justice Breyer dissented and essentially agreed with Justice
Souter, although he did not revisit the holding in Beer.86 The thrust
of Justice Breyer's dissent was that the purpose prong of section 5
is not limited to retrogressive behavior because in his opinion
section 5 was enacted as a remedy to resolve the contrivances of
81. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 893 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter said that
the Supreme Court also held in Richmond that "in adopting the very plan whose effect had
been held to be outside the scope of legal wrong, the city could have acted with an
unlawful, discriminatory intent that would have rendered the annexation unlawful and barred
approval under section 5." Id. at 893. "An official action, whether an annexation or
otherwise, taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race
has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute." Id. at 894 (quoting
Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378) (emphasis added).
82. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 894 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justice pointed out
that the Court in PleasantGrove stated that although an "impermissible purpose could relate
to anticipated circumstances . . . it said nothing about anticipated retrogression." Id.
Therefore, the dissent stated that today's ruling cannot stand unless Pleasant Grove is
overruled because the annexation in that case was denied under the purpose prong of
section 5. Id. Also, the dissent asserted that the majority's appeal to federalism cannot serve
as an excuse to deny voting rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Id.
83. Id. at 895 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that aside from the
deference that the Supreme Court has always afforded the Department of Justice, the plain
language of the statute should control here. Id.
84. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The words "does not" according to Justice Stevens
show that Congress intended the purpose prong to have a present tense meaning that any
intentional denial or abridgement, whether retrogressive or not, violates section 5. Id.
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Because the Beer case is an "effects" case, Justice
Breyer did not reconsider its holding; moreover, he found it unnecessary to re-examine the
case because the purpose prong of section 5, as he saw it, prohibits purposeful denial or
abridgement of minority voting rights. Id.

494

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:477

new discriminatory voting practices adopted by certain states in an
87
effort to stay one step ahead of the federal government.
Administrative or judicial preclearance of a state's legislative or
constitutional enactments regarding changes in its voting practices
or rules, mandated by section 5 of the VRA, is a controversial
remedial procedure passed by Congress under the authority of
section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The VRA, originally
enacted in 1965, was Congress' response to States that for almost
100 years repeatedly refused to abide by the anti-discrimination
mandate regarding voting matters.89 Section 4(a)-(d) of the VRA
87. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 895-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting). To illustrate, Justice
Breyer used as an example the facts of United States v. Mississippi, 229 F Supp. 925, 994
n.86 (S.D. Miss. 1964), in which .3% of the "voting age black population was registered to
vote" in the county because of past discriminatory practices on behalf of the registrar. Id.
Therefore, he reasoned that if a new plan within which .4% of the voting age black
population were allowed to register were enacted with a discriminatory purpose, even
though nonretrogressive, section 5 should prohibit this. Id. at 896-97.
88. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 356-57 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's lone dissent in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach disputes the source of congressional power to enact a
preclearance provision under the Fifteenth Amendment because of his belief that it is
contrary to Article III of the United States Constitution. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment states:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XV
Justice Black's Katzenbach dissent reiterates the oft repeated concept that the federal
courts have "jurisdiction over cases and controversies only." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 357.
Here, Congress has given not only the District Court for the District of Columbia, but also
the Attorney General, authority to pass on the "constitutionality of state laws or
constitutional amendments." Id. at 357. Therefore, unless it can be established that Congress
has created a justiciable case or controversy between the United States and a state, and not
a situation where the state is merely asking for an advisory opinion, Justice Black believed
that section 5 should be struck down as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power. Id.
at 356-57. At the very least, Justice Black continued, if it can be said that Congress has
created a justiciable case or controversy, then the Supreme Court should afford the states a
trial under its original Article II, section 2 jurisdiction of the United States Constitution
which would "treat the States with the dignity to which they should be entitled as
constituent members of our Federal Union." Id. at 357. Article III, section 2 of the United
States Constitution states in part: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, . . . or which shall be
made, under their authority... to controversies to which the United States shall be a party
.. U.S. CONST. art. Im, § 2.

89. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, was soon
followed by the Enforcement Act of 1870 and its subsequent amendments which prohibited
public officers and private persons from obstructing the right to vote as well as providing for
some federal supervision of the electoral process. Id. at 310. Most of these laws were
repealed or fell into desuetude by 1894. Id. Around the same time, many of the southern
States began to enact laws that required a prospective voter to pass a "test" before he could
become a registered voter. Id. at 310-11. The practical results of these tests were that they
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outlines the criteria used to determine which States or political
subdivisions are subject to the preclearance procedures of section
5 of the Act and, as a result, become "covered jurisdictions" for
purposes of the VRA.90
denied or greatly inhibited the Negro from voting, while virtually ensuring that no white
person would be ineligible to vote. Id. at 311. Prior to the VRA, Congress enacted legislation
on practically a case-by-case basis to try to stay ahead of voter discrimination. Id. at 313.
Nonetheless, Congress' efforts were frustrated mainly because voting suits required a
tremendous amount of preparation time, and also because of the amount of delay in the
proceedings. Id. at 314.
90. Id. at 315-16. Section 4(b) of the VRA of 1965 states:
The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any State or in any political subdivision
of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1,
1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census
determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein
were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centun of such persons
voted in the presidential election of November 1964.
Id. at 341.
Louisiana and its political subdivisions are covered jurisdictions under section 4(b) of the
VRA as enacted in 1965. Beer, 425 U.S. at 132. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
discussing the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act provides a detailed summary of the
history of the Act and its extensions and amendments by stating in part:
The committee bill will extend the essential protections of the historic Voting Rights
Act .... Twice before, in 1970 and 1975, the crucial provisions of the Act have been
extended .... The Voting Rights Act was designed to operate on two levels. First it
contained special remedies applicable to particular states or counties covered by the
so-called trigger formula of section 4. If in the 1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential
elections a jurisdiction had a literacy test or similar device and if less than half of its
electorate was registered or voted, then the jurisdiction was covered under section 4.
... The Act also required covered jurisdictions to preclear any changes in voting or
election laws with either the Attorney General or a federal court in the District of
Columbia ....
The second level on which the Act operated was a general prohibition
of discriminatory practices nationwide .... The initial effort to implement the Voting
Rights Act focused on registration. More than a million black citizens were added to
the voting rolls from 1965 to 1972 .... Following the dramatic rise in registration, a
broad array of dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact on the new
black vote .... Their common purpose and effect has been to offset the gains made
at the ballot box under the Act. Congress anticipated this response. The preclearance
provisions of section 5 were designed to halt such efforts . . . .Once the Supreme
Court made clear that section 5 required review of any new laws in covered areas that
could directly or indirectly impair the right to vote, section 5 became the main target
of legislative efforts to undermine the Act. Each time that Congress has continued the
special coverage of the Voting Rights Act the argument has been made that section 5
was no longer needed. Congress has had to balance a record of some progress against
strong evidence of continuing discrimination. And each time Congress has decided to
retain section 5 . . . . In August 1970, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 (Public Law 91-285), which extended coverage to section 5 and
the other special provisions of the Act for an additional five years for the jurisdictions
whose coverage was triggered by the 1965 Act. Congress also brought under the Act's
special coverage States and political subdivisions that maintained a test or device on
November 1, 1968, and that had less than a 50 percent turnout or registration rate for
the 1968 presidential election. Lastly, it established a five-year nationwide ban on the

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:477

Just five months prior to the enactment of the VRA, in Louisiana
v. United States,91 the State of Louisiana was found to have
violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments through its use
of an "interpretation test" and a "citizenship test," each of which
limited the number of eligible voters.9 2 The "interpretation test"
use of literacy tests or other devices ....
In 1975, Congress again faced the situation
it had observed in 1970. While most jurisdictions had complied with section 4 for ten
years by not using tests or devices, there had nonetheless been widespread violation
of the Act and widespread voting discrimination in the covered jurisdictions ....
Once again, Congress continued the preclearance requirements for the jurisdictions
originally covered in 1965, not on the basis of some permanent stigma for events
which had occurred before 1965, but rather on the basis of a careful review of the
contemporaneous record of ongoing voting rights discrimination in 1970 and 1975,
respectively. In August of 1975, Congress extended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for 7
years, so that jurisdictions originally subject to the special provisions of the Act
remained covered until August 6, 1982. Congress also made permanent the nationwide
ban on literary tests and other devices, which it had imposed on a temporary basis in
1970 . . . In the Committee's view the extensive hearing record compiled by the
Senate and the House Judiciary Committee demonstrates conclusively that the Act's
preclearance requirement must be continued . .. . The Committee's analysis of the
performance of the covered jurisdictions in recent years constitutes the basis for our
conclusion that section 5, as well as the other special provisions, remain necessary
and appropriate legislation to ensure the full enforcement of the rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution . . . . The Committee
considered and rejected suggestions that the section 5 preclearance provision be
extended to every single jurisdiction of the nation ....
[Elnactment of nationwide
preclearance would be an administrative nightmare for the Department of Justice ....
[I]n the Committee's view, there is a serious question of whether or not nationwide
preclearance would be constitutional. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would
sustain in the extension of this "uncommon exercise of Congressional power" in the
absence of a similarly detailed record of voting discrimination nationwide.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5-15 (1982).
91. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
92. Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 153-55. Louisiana's long history of voting discrimination
began with the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution of 1898. Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 147.
At that time, approximately 44% of all the registered voters in the State were Negroes. Id. at
147. The adoption of the 1898 Constitution, however, entailed burdensome registration
requirements for voters, except those "who had been entitled to vote before January 1, 1867,
or who was the son or grandson of such a person," by force of a "grandfather clause." Id. at
147-48. This clause, held to be an unconstitutional violation of the Fifteenth Amendment in
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), practically eliminated Negroes from the voter
registry as most Negroes had been slaves up until 1863 and were not permitted to vote until
after 1867. Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 148. In its stead, the Louisiana legislature enacted an
"interpretation test" in 1921 requiring "an applicant for registration be able to 'give a
reasonable interpretation' of any clause in the Louisiana Constitution or the Constitution of
the United States." Id. As a result of this test, between 1921 and 1944 the percentage of
registered Negro voters in Louisiana never exceeded one percent. Id. Nevertheless, after a
white only primary law had been struck down in Texas in the case of Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944), Negro voter registration rose from .296 to approximately 15% by 1956.
Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 148-49. This increase in Negro voter registration prompted the
"Segregation Committee" (created by the Louisiana Legislature) to order the registrars in the
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vested an almost limitless amount of power in the voting registrar
to determine who could and who could not register to vote.93 Thus,
the "interpretation test" was rendered per se invalid under both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because the Supreme Court
ruled that not even an injunction enjoining its unfair application
could save it.94 The "citizenship test," because it did not require
reregistration of voters already accepted by the registrars, was
enjoined until the twenty-one parishes that applied the
interpretation test "ordered a complete reregistration of voters, so
that the new test will apply alike to all or to none." 5 Hence,
Louisiana illustrates not only that the State of Louisiana became a
"covered jurisdiction" when the Voting Rights Act was enacted, but
it also illustrates the frustration Congress experienced in enforcing
the Fifteenth Amendment because it demonstrates the common
practice of enacting a new test as soon as an old one is ruled
96
unconstitutional.
Shortly after the VRA was signed into law, the constitutionality
of many of its provisions was challenged in the case of South
Carolinav. Katzenbach.97 Section 5, in particular, was contested as
an infringement upon Article III's prohibition of federal advisory
opinions.98 Chief Justice Warren met this contention by explaining
that because the Act suspends any voting regulations enacted after
parishes to apply the interpretation test and, as a result, purged thousands of Negroes from
the voting rolls. Id. at 149-50.
93. Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 152-53. Even though the 1898 Louisiana Constitutional
Convention denounced an "interpretation test" as an act of "arbitrary power," which
contained virtually no form of redress for an effected individual, it nonetheless was adopted
some 23 years later. Id. at 152.
94. Id. at 150-51.
95. Id. at 155. The constitutionality of the "citizenship test" was not challenged in the
complaint; therefore, neither the district court nor the Supreme Court passed upon its
validity. Id. at 154-55 n.17. At oral argument in Louisiana, the Government averred that it
had a suit pending in a lower court challenging the constitutionality of the "registration
procedures in Louisiana 'under the new regime.' " Id.
96. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313-14, 318.
97. 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). Out of the 19 sections of the Act, the Supreme Court
reviewed the validity of sections 4(a)-(d), 5, 6(b), 7, 9, 13(a), and procedural portions of
section 14 as being applicable to South Carolina at the time of the litigation. Id. at 317. The
Court held that all of the challenged provisions were "valid means for carrying out the
commands of the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 337.
98. Id. at 323. In addition, because litigation of these matters is assigned to the District
Court for the District of Columbia, Section 14(b) was challenged as an infringement of due
process because the forum for hearing the case is often distant. Id. The Supreme Court held
that this provision was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to "appropriately limit
litigation under this provision to a single court in the District of Columbia ...under Art. IMI,
section 1, to 'ordain and establish' inferior federal tribunals." Id. at 331.
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November 1, 1964, a covered jurisdiction that desires to employ
changes in its voting laws is faced with an immediate and concrete
controversy 9 Although the constitutionality of section 5 was
upheld in Katzenbach, the next question that the Court faced was
whether certain state enactments were subject to the preclearance
procedure required by the Act.00
Before being able to address this question and the other
substantive issues in Allen v. State Board of Elections,'° ' the
Supreme Court first had to decide critical jurisdictional issues
involving section 5 challenges brought by private citizens. 102 Having
99. Id. at 335. Although the Court stated that this provision is "an uncommon exercise
of congressional power," nonetheless, "the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions
can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate." Id. at 334. In response, apart
from his Article III objections, Justice Black stated:
I cannot agree with the Court that Congress-denied a power in itself to veto a state
law-can delegate this same power to the Attorney General or the District Court for
the District of Columbia. For the effect on the States is the same in both cases-they
cannot pass their laws without sending their agents to the City of Washington to plead
to federal officials for their advance approval.
Id. at 361 (Black, J., dissenting).
100. Allen, 393 U.S. at 548.
101. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
102. Id. at 554. The initial question that was to be decided in these cases was whether
a private person could obtain a declaratory judgment that a State has failed to submit
proposed changes in voting legislation to the Attorney General or District Court for
preclearance and, subsequently, enjoin enforcement of the provisions. Id. at 555. Because
section 5 of the Act provides that "no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to
comply with [a new state enactment covered by, but not approved under, section 5]," if a
person can prove that the State has failed to submit the legislation for section 5 approval,
that person has standing to obtain an injunction pending the State's submission pursuant to
section 5. Id. Notwithstanding this provision, it was argued by appellees in these cases that
only the Attorney General is authorized to institute an action under section 5 of the Act, and
that private litigants should bring suit under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 556-57.
However, the Court reasoned that if a citizen were to rely only upon the Attorney General to
bring suit, or upon bringing his own suit under the Fifteenth Amendment, the Act's goal of
eliminating voting discrimination would be an "empty promise." Id. at 556-57. The court
found that it would be nearly impossible for the Attorney General to keep tabs on all of the
new enactments in the States because the Act also reaches to the political subdivisions
therein. Id. at 556. Moreover, it was because suits brought under the Fifteenth Amendment
were not an effective means of eradicating voting discrimination, that the VRA was passed.
Id. at 557. Furthermore, it was argued by appellees that under section 14(b) of the Act, "[n]o
other court than the District Court for the District of Columbia... shall have jurisdiction to
issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to [section 5] or any restraining order or temporary
or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of any provision of this Act"
(all of these cases were brought in the district courts wherein the plaintiffs reside). Id. at
554, 557-58. However, the Court held that Congress established the District Court for the
District of Columbia as an inferior federal tribunal under its Article II, section 1 powers to
hear litigation by a State against the Federal Government that, pursuant to section 5, seeks a
declaratory judgment that a new enactment does not have the purpose or effect of racial
discrimination. Id. at 558-59. Unlike a State, the Court continued, a private litigant only
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determined that the cases were properly before it, the Supreme
Court considered arguments that section 5 was inapplicable to
changes involving qualifications of candidates, replacing district
voting with at-large voting, and decisions of a state legislature
concerning which offices should be subject to election. 1°3 The Court
held that section 5 of the VRA should be construed broadly and
was meant to cover even minor changes that a covered jurisdiction
enacts, and, as a result, ruled that all of the contested enactments
should be enjoined until section 5 is complied with. 1°4 The Court
expressed no opinion as to whether these changes in voting
procedures were constitutional. 15
seeks a declaratory judgment that under the Voting Rights Act, the new enactment of a State
must be submitted for approval before enforcement and, therefore, because the United
States is not a party, the case need not be heard in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. Id. The final jurisdictional hurdle was whether the Supreme Court could hear
these cases that were brought before three-judge district courts. Id. at 560. The Supreme
Court only has jurisdiction of a case heard by a three-judge district court if the three-judge
court was properly convened. Id. Under section 5, the Court reasoned, suits may be brought
in three different ways:
"First... the State may institute a declaratory judgment action. Second, an individual
may bring a suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming that a state
requirement is covered by section 5, but has not been subjected to federal scrutiny.
Third, the Attorney General may bring an injunctive action to prohibit the
enforcement of a new regulation because of the State's failure to obtain approval
under section 5.
Id. at 561. Therefore, the Court found that due to the extraordinary nature of the
preclearance provisions of section 5, all three types of these suits may be considered to be
brought under section 5, and therefore, subject to being heard by a three-judge panel. Id. at
563.
103. Id. at 564-65. Appellees contended that section 5 should be construed narrowly to
only reach changes that would direct who may or may not vote. Id. at 564.
104. Id. at 565-66, 572. The Court examined the legislative history surrounding the
passage of the Act because the language in the statute was not "crystal clear" on how far it
should reach. Id. at 570. In each case, the Court found that the legislative history would
subject each enactment to section 5 scrutiny because they all constitute a "voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting." Id. at 569.
105. Id. at 571. The aim of section 5 is to require the submission of changes to either
the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia for approval before
enactment; thus, the issue for the Supreme Court in this case was not whether the
enactments were within the confines of the Fifteenth Amendment, but rather, whether the
enactments were to be submitted for section 5 preclearance. Id. at 570-72. Justice Harlan
dissented saying that the scope of section 5 cannot be divorced from the substance of
section 4. Id. at 584 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Hence, Justice Harlan reasoned that once the
"tests and devices" of section 4 were removed and Negroes attained full access to the ballot
box, federal intervention would no longer be needed Id. at 585-86. Furthermore, he
continued, Congress refused to premise the VRA under its enforcement power of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but specifically based the Act upon the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at
588. Thus, Justice Harlan believed that the standard the Court should have followed was
articulated in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) which established that the
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Subsequently, in Georgia v. United States,10 6 the Supreme Court
stayed an injunction issued by the district court without reaching
the constitutionality of Georgia's reapportionment plan; future
elections held under that plan were enjoined until preclearance
could be obtained under section 5.107 In Georgia, the State argued
that section 5 does not apply to reapportionment plans, and that in
any event, its 1972 plan should not be considered "a change from
procedures 'in force or effect on November 1, 1964.' "108 The Court
once again emphasized that the issue in a section 5 case "is
whether the substance of these changes undertaken as part of the
state reapportionment are 'standards, practices, or procedures with
respect to voting' within the meaning of [that section]." 109
Consequently, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, held that the
reapportionment plan was subject to section 5 of the VRA and
Fifteenth Amendment is violated when redistricting is "done with the purpose of excluding
Negroes from a municipality" thereby practically eliminating the vote of the Negro by use of
the gerrymander. Allen, 393 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority based its
decision on Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) which is a reapportionment case brought
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and dealt with dilution of
voting power. Allen, 393 U.S. at 589. Justice Black reiterated the opinion he authored in
Katzenbach and would have held section 5 to be unconstitutional because nowhere is there
to be found the authority for "degrading these States" to asking permission of the federal
government to change their laws. Id. at 595-97 (Black, J., dissenting).
106. 411 U.S. 526 (1973). After the 1970 census, Georgia enacted a reapportionment
plan in 1971 for its State House of Representatives which "decreased the number of districts
from 118 to 105, and increased the number of multimember districts from 47 to 49." Id. at
528. This plan differed significantly from its previous apportionment in that instead of
preserving county lines, "31 of the 49 multimember districts and 21 of the 56 single-member
districts irregularly crossed county boundaries." Id. In addition, the 1971 plan changed nearly
all of the district boundaries as well as altered the "number of representatives per district."
Id. at 528-29. Moreover, "[r]esidents of some 31 counties formerly in single-member districts
were brought into multimember districts." Id. at 529.
107. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 528. In this case, Georgia submitted its 1971 reapportionment
plan to the Attorney General who objected and stated formally that he was "unable to
conclude that the plan does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." Id. at 529-30.
Immediately thereafter, Georgia enacted a new apportionment plan and submitted it to the
Attorney General who promptly objected nine days later because it did not remove what he
considered features that were objectionable in the prior plan. Id. at 530.
108. Id. at 531. November 1, 1964, is the date set by Congress to be utilized under
section 5 of the VRA for determining what jurisdictions are "covered jurisdictions."
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 342. Georgia argued that the Attorney General could not issue a vague
objection to the reapportionment plan, but had to find that the plan was enacted with a
discriminatory purpose or had that effect. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 531.
109. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 531. The Court went on to opine that whether the
reapportionment was racially discriminatory should not be the focus, but, rather, whether
the enactment had the "potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote" should be focused
upon. Id. at 534.
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reaffirmed the Act's constitutionality.1 10
Having found that reapportionment was a proper subject for
section 5 preclearance, the Supreme Court in Perkins v.
Matthews"' also found that annexation was a legitimate concern of
2
the VRA and should be scrutinized under section 5 as well."
Similar to the Allen Court, the Court in Perkins, in an opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, stated that the question was not
whether the annexation was enacted with a discriminatory purpose
or effect, but, rather, whether annexation constituted a "voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or
procedure with respect to voting within the meaning of section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act."" 3 The Court found that the changes in
boundary lines of a voting district do have the potential for
"denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.""

4

Thus, the Court concluded that annexations can no longer

110. Id. at 535. Justice Stewart, relying upon the legislative history surrounding the
extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1970, also stated that had Congress disapproved of the
construction of section 5 promulgated by the Allen court, it could easily have amended the
language of the statute. Id. at 533. Furthermore, the Court embraced Reynolds v. Sims as
controlling in the instant case. Id. Although conceding the constitutionality of section 5 of
the Act, the dissent of Justice White, joined by Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist,
recognized that in light of the enormous burden placed on a sovereign State in making
changes to its voting laws, the Attorney General should state a concrete objection to the
proposed enactment so the State can examine its substance before deciding what course it
should pursue. Id. at 543-44 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissent echoed the
dissenting opinions of Justice Black in Katzenbach and Allen. Id. at 545 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
111. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
112. Perkins, 400 U.S. at 390. Perkins involved challenges brought by several voters
and candidates for public office to the decision of the City of Canton, Mississippi, to change
the location of its polling places, change its municipal boundaries through annexation, and
change from ward to at-large election of its aldermen. Id. at 382-83. Canton enacted these
changes without submitting them to the Attorney General or obtaining a declaratory
judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 383.
113. Id. at 384-85. The case was brought in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi and, as the Court in Alien held, the district court's mission in
such a case is to determine the extent of "coverage" of the Act and not the "substantive
discrimination" question which is left to the District Court for the District of Columbia or the
Attorney General. Id.
114. Id. at 388-89. Justice Brennan first relied upon the Reynolds reapportionment case
which in part held that a change in boundary lines not only determines who may or may not
vote in a municipal election, but also dilutes the votes of those citizens who voted
pre-annexation. Id. at 388 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555). Next, Justice Brennan proposed
that an annexation is similar to the redrawing of boundary lines in a gerrymandering case as
both have the potential for "racial discrimination in voting." Id. at 389 (citing Gomillion, 364
U.S. 339). Finally, quoting a study prepared by the director of the United States Civil Rights
Commission on the VRA who reported that gerrymandering and boundary changes had
become prime weapons for discriminating against Negro voters, Justice Brennan wrote:
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be carried out freely in a covered jurisdiction, but must first pass
the watchful eye of the Attorney General or be declared
non-violative of section 5 by the United States District Court for
115
the District of Columbia.
Until Richmond the Supreme Court had only dealt with the issue
of whether a change to a voting law was subject to section 5;
however, the Court in Richmond was faced with the question of
whether the City of Richmond, in a declaratory judgment action
brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, had carried its burden of proving that its annexation
plan did not have the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging
the right of the Richmond Negro community to vote."6 The
"These measures have taken the form of switching to at-large elections where Negro voting
strength is concentrated in particular election districts, facilitating the consolidation of
predominantly Negro and predominantly white counties, and redrawing the lines of districts
to divide concentrations of Negro voting strength." Id.
115. Id. at 403-04 (Black, J., dissenting). In this case, the Court showed "great
deference" to the Department of Justice's opinion regarding the scope of section 5 because it
is the executive department charged with administering the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 391.
Between 1965 and 1969, the Justice Department reviewed 313 changes in voting laws that
were submitted to it, and, in each case where a boundary or election district line had been
redrawn, the Department decided that the change was within the reach of section 5. Id. at
393-94. Justice Harlan, dissenting in part, noted that the Court, in his opinion, placed far too
much weight on the "handful" of boundary line cases that have been presented to the
Attorney General for approval, and for that reason, he would not go beyond A/en to hold
that annexations fall under section 5 perusal. Id. at 399 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
Justice Black vigorously defended his position that he first stated in Katzenbach opining that
section 5 is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power. Id. at 401-04 (Black, J.,
dissenting). The Justice likened the Court's decision to what he believed was the
questionable practice of the Reconstruction era, as well as to what he surmised ran counter
to the complaints of the 13 Colonies against the British King:
He has refused his Assent to Laws .... He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws
of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his
Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend
them.-He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of
people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the
Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.-He has called
together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the
depository of their public Records.
TuE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3-6 (U.S. 1776).
116. Richmond, 422 U.S. at 362. On July 12, 1969, a special three-judge Virginia
annexation court awarded the City of Richmond roughly 23 miles of land in Chesterfield
County that included 47,262 people: 1,557 were black, and 45,705 were nonblack. Id. at 363.
Prior to the annexation, blacks made up 52% of the total population of Richmond. Id. After
the annexation, only 42% of the citizenry were black. Id. In addition, Richmond changed its
at-large voting procedure into a nine-ward councilmanic voting district after the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia decided City of Petersburg v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (1972), in which annexation was denied to the city where at-large
council elections were the rule before and after the annexation. Richmond, 422 U.S. at 365.
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Supreme Court first dealt with the effect prong of section 5 and
found that "a reduction of a racial group's relative political strength
in the community does not always deny or abridge the right to vote
within the meaning of section 5. "117 Nevertheless, the Court
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
annexation was enacted with a discriminatory purpose, even
though it ruled that the annexation attained a perfectly legal result
under the effect prong of section 5.118 Thus, having decided that the
effect of an annexation could be proper under section 5 even if it
has an adverse impact on Negro voting power, the Court, in Beer,
subsequently dealt with the issue of whether a reapportionment
with no adverse impact on Negro voting power could be denied
section 5 preclearance." 9
In Beer, the City of New Orleans was denied preclearance by the
district court after enacting a reapportionment plan that enhanced
Nevertheless, the district court held that Richmond enacted the annexation with a
discriminatory purpose and effect, and denied preclearance because the city had not done all
that it could to reduce the vote dilution effect on black voting power after the annexation.
Id. at 367.
117. Id. at 368-69. Justice White, writing for the Court, held that the Petersburg case,
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court without opinion, was correctly decided and
adopted its interpretation of the effect prong of section 5. Id. at 370. The Court found that
any annexation, of necessity, changes a city's racial composition to some extent, and was
unwilling to hold that a shift in the racial balance, even if done for vital economic purposes
or if favored by members of each race, would be barred preclearance under section 5. Id. at
369. Moreover, Justice White stated that when the black population percentage is reduced by
the annexation, as long as the voting system "fairly reflects the strength of the [resultant]
Negro community" it does not have the impermissible effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote. Id. at 370-71. The Court further stated that where post-annexation representation of
the black community closely mirrors the proportion of black voter strength before the
annexation, the effect of such a plan cannot be said to be retrogressive for section 5
purposes, although the overall black population may have decreased. Id. at 371-72.
118. Id. at 378. Justice Scalia, in Bossier ParishII, distinguished Richmond explaining
that "[tihe approved effect of the redistricting . . . and the hypothetically disapproved
purpose, were both retrogressive." Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 873 (emphasis in the
original). Justice Scalia explained that this constituted an "ex necessitate limitation upon the
effect prong in the particular context of annexation." Id. In contrast, Justice Souter asserted
in Bossier ParishII that in light of Richmond, a voting change could be denied preclearance
if enacted with a discriminatory purpose, even though it had a nonretrogressive effect. Id. at
894 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119. Beer, 425 U.S. at 139. The district court in the Beer case did not consider whether
the disputed plan was enacted with a discriminatory purpose as it found that the plan had
the effect of abridging the right of Negro voters to vote based on their race or color. Id. at
136. In fact, when Beer was decided, there was no precedent that a discriminatory purpose
as well as a discriminatory effect must be found in order to establish a violation of the
Constitution. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. at 876. Therefore, Justice Scalia stated that any
reliance placed on Beer to establish a rule for the purpose prong of section 5 is totally
misplaced. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 876.
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the position of black voters in comparison to the apportionment
plan that it replaced. 120 Even though the plan was ameliorative, the
district court ruled that it still had "the effect of abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color." 2 ' The Supreme Court rejected
this interpretation of section 5 because it noted that the intention
of the disputed section was to "freez[e] election procedures" so
that gains realized in minority political participation would not "be
destroyed
through
new
[discriminatory]
procedures
and
122
techniques."
Therefore, Justice Stewart's holding for the Court
was that section 5's objective is to eliminate any changes in voting
practices or procedures "that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise
23
of the electoral franchise."
120. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. In 1961, New Orleans had a city council made up of seven
members, two of which were elected by the voters at-large while the remaining five were
elected from five single-member councilmanic districts. Id. at 134-35. In none of the districts
did Negroes conunand a majority of the voting population. Id. at 135. As a result of the 1970
census the city council adopted a reapportionment plan ("Plan I") that was denied
preclearance by the Attorney General because it was very similar to the plan it replaced. Id.
Thereafter, the council proposed Plan II that provided for two black-majority population
districts and one black-majority voter district. Id. at 135-36. After being denied preclearance
by the Attorney General here as well, the City brought a declaratory judgment action in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 136.
121. Id. at 136. In its calculations, the district court reasoned that due to the
population of registered black voters in the city, blacks should be able to elect 2.42 of the
city's seven councilmen but, because of the history of bloc voting in New Orleans, would
probably be able to elect only one councilman. Id. at 136-37. Justice Stewart, however,
stated that the Court had never promulgated the concept that "members of a minority group
have a federal right to be represented in legislative bodies in proportion to their number in
the general population." Id. at 137 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)).
Moreover, Justice Stewart noted that the district court failed to take into account that the
two at-large seats were not subject to the preclearance provisions of section 5 because they
were part of a voting practice since 1954 and, therefore, not a change after 1964. Beer, 415
U.S. at 134, 137. Had it done so, Justice Stewart explained, the district court would have
found that even though proportional representation is not a constitutional mandate, blacks
had the potential of electing 1.7 of the 5 seats properly at issue in this case, which is
commensurate with the number of registered black voters. Id. at 137.
122. Id. at 140-41 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-196, at 57-58). Even Justice Brennan
acknowledged as much stating that "the fundamental objective of section 5 . . . [is] the
protection of present levels of voting effectiveness for the black population." Beer, 415 U.S.
at 141 n.12 (quoting Richmond, 422 U.S. at 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in the

original).
123. Id. at 141. Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, argued that any change a
political subdivision enacts should be measured by whether it denies or abridges the right to
vote regardless of the pre-existing voting practices. Id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting). Despite
his statement in Richmond, Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's lengthy dissent that
examined the legislative history of the VRA which he believed led to the conclusion: "[TIhat
section 5 was designed to preclude new districting plans that 'perpetuate discrimination,' to
prevent covered jurisdictions from 'circumventing the guarantees of the Fifteenth
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Although the Beer case established that a retrogressive effect
was necessary in order to withhold preclearance of a voting
change, Rome v. United States 24 added that a voting practice that
has such a discriminatory effect can be denied section 5
preclearance even if it was instituted without a discriminatory
purpose. 25 Rome also analyzed the issue of whether a city can
exempt itself from section 5 scrutiny, even though it is a political
unit of a covered State, if it has not discriminated against blacks
for the past seventeen years.' 26 The Court decided the latter issue
by holding that the "bailout" provision of section 4(a) does not
apply to a city because a city is covered by the Act as a result of
being part of a covered state and, therefore, until the state seeks to
utilize the "bailout" provision, the city remains bound to the
requirements of section 5 preclearance. 27 The Court went on to
Amendment' by switching to new, and discriminatory, districting plans the moment litigants
appear on the verge of having an existing one declared unconstitutional." Id. at 151
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall would have judged a new voting practice by the
strictures of the Fifteenth Amendment, which, as he viewed it, also adopts the compilation
of holdings from the Fourteenth Amendment because anyone whose vote is denied or
abridged due to their race is also denied equal protection of the laws. Id. at 156.
124. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
125. Rome, 446 U.S. at 172-73. Appellants argued that even though the "purpose and
effect" prongs of section 5 are stated in the conjunctive, nonetheless, the Act is
unconstitutional because of their claim that section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment only
forbids intentional discrimination and that Congress exceeded its authority under the
enforcement clause of section 2 of that Amendment when it authorized denial of
preclearance to voting changes enacted without a discriminatory racial purpose, but merely
with a discriminatory effect. Id. at 172-73.
126. Id. at 162-67. Section 4(a) of the VRA, extended in 1975 for 7 years, provides a
"bailout" procedure that permits a covered jurisdiction to bring a declaratory judgment
action in the District Court for the District of Columbia within which a three-judge panel
would decide whether a petitioning jurisdiction met its burden of proof that in the last
seventeen years it has not used a "test or device . . . for the purpose or with the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Id. at 167.
127. Id. at 167. Justice Powell dissented from the majority's interpretation of the
"bailout" provision as raising "grave questions as to the constitutionality of the Act." Id. at
194 (Powell, J., dissenting). For instance, Congress, in passing the Act under the enforcement
clause of the Fifteenth Amendment, could only authorize such a drastic measure as
preclearance if it was operating to "remedy violations of voting rights." Id. at 200. In light of
the district court's findings that the City of Rome has not discriminated against the voting
rights of its black citizens for the past seventeen years, the Justice averred that the Fifteenth
Amendment no longer authorized the continuing supervision of Rome's voting procedures
until the whole State of Georgia bailed out. Id. at 200-01. Furthermore, Justice Powell argued
that the whole state is subject to being held "hostage" to a single subdivision thereof; thus
rendering the Act far more "overbroad" than constitutionally permissible (for example, the
State of Alaska has been the only successful state to bailout with 302,000 people and 60
subdivisions compared to Georgia's over 5 million inhabitants and 877 subdivisions which
makes the likelihood of Georgia ever being able to satisfy the bailout requirements
practically nil). Id. at 203-05. Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justice Stewart, and
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explain that Congress has the power under the section 2
enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment to prohibit voting
changes that have a discriminatory effect, even if section 1 of the
Fifteenth Amendment could be interpreted to forbid only
intentional discrimination. 128 Consequently, the district court's
denial of preclearance based upon its finding that the City of
opined that Congress has three possible sources of congressional enforcement power
First . . . if the proposed changes would violate the Constitution, Congress could
certainly prohibit their implementation ....
[11f the electoral changes in issue do not
violate the Constitution, as judicially interpreted, it must be determined whether
Congress could nevertheless appropriately prohibit these changes under the other two
theories of congressional power . . . . Congress can act remedially to enforce the
judicially established substantive prohibitions of the Amendments. If not properly
remedial, the exercise of this power could be sustained only if this Court accepts the
premise of the third theory that Congress has the authority under its enforcement
powers to determine . . . that electoral changes with a disparate impact on race
violate the Constitution, in which case Congress by a legislative Act could effectively
amend the Constitution.
Id. at 209-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (stating
that "If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means.' It would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.' ") Under this approach, it is
difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power. See Van Alstyne,
The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 46 DuKE L.J. 291, 292-303 (1996). ("Shifting legislative majorities could change
the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process
contained in Article V.").
128. Rome, 446 U.S. at 177. The Court reasoned that Congress' broad enforcement
power over the Civil War Amendments (section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, and section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment) enables it to pass legislation that is "appropriate" to "secure
the guarantees" of those Amendments even if an act that it prohibits is not in and of itself
violative of said Amendment. Id. at 174-76. For instance, the VRA places a per se ban on
literacy tests which if employed in a fair manner, do not violate the Fifteenth Amendment,
yet they are properly forbidden because they perpetuate past discrimination. Id. at 175-76.
Justice Rehnquist found the majority's reasoning a bit hard to swallow in light of the Court's
decision the same day in City of Mobile v. Bolden, where a plurality of the Court held that
"the city of Mobile [did] not violate the Constitution by maintaining an at-large system of
electing officials unless voters can prove that system is a product of purposeful
discrimination." Id. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Mobile, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); see
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (holding that even if the Village's zoning ordinance has a
discriminatory effect on respondents, without proof of discriminatory intent, the ordinance
must be upheld); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that an official action
will not be determined to be unconstitutional merely because it has a disparate impact upon
one race). The apparent inconsistency in these holdings can be rectified when one considers
that Rome is a VRA section 5 preclearance case, while Mobile is a VRA section 2 case; hence
in Mobile, appellee plaintiffs in the action, had the burden of proving a constitutional
violation, while in Rome, appellant city had the burden of proving that its voting practice
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color." Rome, 446 U.S. at 163, 172. See also Mobile, 446 U.S. at
58-59.
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Rome's electoral changes diluted the strength of the Negro vote
129
was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In City of Lockhart v. United States, 30 Justice Powell, writing for
the Court, extended Beer's section 5 preclearance jurisprudence
even further by determining what standard of comparison a new
voting practice is measured against to ascertain whether it is
retrogressive.' 3 ' The Supreme Court ruled that the district court
erred in finding retrogressive effect because that court used an
inappropriate baseline by which to compare Lockhart's new voting
standards. 32 By applying the Beer test, the Supreme Court found
that the new voting plan was not any more discriminatory than the
one it replaced and, hence, was entitled to preclearance under
section 5.133 The Court explained that the fact that numbered-post
systems and staggered terms may have a discriminatory effect in
certain situations does not mean that they diminished the voting
strength of Lockhart's minorities in relation to the position those
1
same minorities were in prior to the changes.
The issue in Pleasant Grove was whether a proposed plan that
was not immediately retrogressive could be denied preclearance if
the plan was enacted with a purpose of future retrogression. 35 In
129. Rome, 446 U.S. at 183. The district court found that Rome's "electoral changes
from plurality-win to majority-win elections, numbered posts, and staggered terms, when
combined with the presence of racial bloc voting and Rome's majority white population and
at-large electoral system, would dilute Negro voting strength." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court
harmonized its holding with that of Beer in that Rome's electoral changes "would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral [process]." Id. at 185.
130. 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
131. Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 132-33. The city of Lockhart, Texas, approved a new "home
rule" type of government in 1973 which included "a mayor and four councilmen serving
staggered terms." Id. at 127-28. Prior to adopting this form of government, Lockhart was a
"general law" city which was only entitled to possess specific state-authorized powers, but,
nonetheless, authorized a "numbered-post" electoral system for its two city councilmen. Id.
at 127. A "numbered-post" type of system (which, in reality, makes each contested seat a
separate election) was not authorized by Texas state law; however, Lockhart had been using
this electoral practice since 1917. Id. at 127, 132.
132. Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 135. Two justices of the district court ruled that it was not
proper to compare the new voting practice with the existing electoral system because that
system was illegal under Texas state law and, therefore, they proceeded to measure it
against what they believed an authorized system would be. Id. at 132.
133. Id. at 134. The Court recapitulated its understanding of section 5 by explaining
that the intent of that section is to prohibit "retrogression in minority voting strength"
irrespective of whether or not the existing law is considered legal by the covered state. Id. at
133.
134. Id. at 135.
135. Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 470-72. The city of Pleasant Grove, Alabama, sought
preclearance under section 5 of the VRA of two annexations: The first involving a 40 acre
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answering this question, the Supreme Court refuted appellant's
argument that absent immediate retrogressive
effect the
annexations could not have been enacted with a discriminatory
purpose by promulgating the opinion that section 5 preclearance is
not limited to looking at the present circumstances, but also
includes a consideration of the effect the annexations could have
on future minority voting strength. 136 Hence, the Court explained
that it can plausibly be reasoned that if the effect of the
annexations is to minimize "future black voting strength," then
those annexations can likewise be considered to have been enacted
with a retrogressive purpose in relation to the status quo if the city
137
cannot carry its burden of proving a lack of discriminatory intent.
As a consequence, the Court held that the city had not met its
burden of disproving discriminatory purpose, and, therefore,
section 5 preclearance was denied.'3
parcel of land that included "an extended white family" and the second involving a 450 acre
uninhabited parcel of land. Id. at 465-66. Moreover, at the time of the annexations there
were no registered black voters in the covered jurisdiction. Id. at 470-71. Thus, Pleasant
Grove argued that because there were no black voters to begin with, it could not have acted
with a retrogressive purpose because the annexations in question could not dilute minority
voting strength when there was none to begin with. Id.
136. Id. at 471. Along with stating the impermissible future effects the proposed
annexations could entail, the Supreme Court also stated that "an impermissible purpose
under section 5 may relate to anticipated as well as present circumstances." Id. The Court
relied on its reasoning in Richmond that even an annexation that has "a perfectly legal
result," if enacted "for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their
race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute." Id. at 471 n.11
(citing Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378-79).
137. Id. at 471-72. In addition to analyzing the city's two annexations in question, the
Court also noted that its failure to annex a black area that had petitioned for annexation was
a significant factor pointing to discriminatory motivation. Id. at 470. Nevertheless, Justice
Powell in his dissent asserted that the addition of the 40 acres involving the one white family
in 1969 which added 12 white voters to a city of 7,000 and, now, 15 years later that number
being only 20 white voters, is hardly a retrogressive effect on voting in Pleasant Grove. Id. at
475 (Powell, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority's reasoning
concerning a "potential for racial discrimination in voting" as applying to some future
happening is misguided because the "potential" referred to only applies to "present and
concrete effects." Id. at 475-76. Thus, Justice Powell stated that the comparison should be
between the "the minority's political potential" before the annexation and the annexation's
realistic effect, as opposed to its hypothetical effect on the minority's political potential
afterward. Id. at 476-77. Justice Powell especially took exception to the extremely
speculative nature of the majority's belief regarding the second annexation of the 450 acres
of uninhabited land, i.e., that only white voters would move into the annexed area. Id. at
477-78.
138. Id. at 472. Justice Powell argued that even if the city had a discriminatory purpose
in annexing the territories, unless that discrimination was based upon an intention to deny
voting rights, there was no justification for denying preclearance because it would exceed
the scope of the VRA. Id. at 479-80 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Despite the holding in Pleasant Grove, the Court in Miller
emphasized that in a reapportionment case, the Justice Department
could not find an improper discriminatory purpose under section 5
of the Voting Rights Act when a state enacted an ameliorative
reapportionment plan that satisfied constitutional criteria, even
though the plan did not "maximiz[e]" black voting strength. 3 9 The
Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision to use strict
scrutiny to analyze Georgia's redistricting plan relying on the
reasoning in Shaw v. Reno, 140 which stated that race cannot be the
14
predominant factor for dividing citizens into voting districts. '
Thus, the Court concluded that an improper purpose may be found
when a state enacts a reapportionment plan that violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, even
though a state "maximizes" minority voting strength in drawing
139. Miller, 515 U.S. at 924-25. Due to the 1990 Decennial Census, Georgia became
entitled to an additional congressional seat; therefore, the General Assembly redrew its
congressional districts. Id. at 906. Guidelines adopted by the Georgia legislature in
redistricting were traditional principles that recognized "single-member districts of equal
population, contiguous geography, nondilution of minority voting strength, fidelity to precinct
lines where possible, and compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the [Voting Rights] Act." Id.
Although, the General Assembly developed a plan that increased the number of
majority-minority districts from one to two, the Department of Justice denied preclearance
of the change because it did not concentrate enough minorities to create a third
majority-black district. Id. at 906-07. After revising the plan, but with still two majority-black
districts, the Justice Department denied preclearance again because it determined that the
plan was deficient in comparison to a plan submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), the "max-black" plan, which would maximize black voting power. Id. at 907-08.
Consequently, Georgia created a plan with three majority-minority voting districts based
upon the ACLU plan that was finally granted preclearance by the Attorney General. Id. at
907-09. Elections were held under this plan and black candidates were elected in each

black-majority district. Id. at 909.
140. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
141. Id. at 911-12. Five white voters from the newly created majority-black district
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against
various state officials alleging that the new district they created "was a racial gerrymander"
in "violation of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by Shaw v. Reno." Id. at 909. The
district court agreed with the affected voters and applied strict scrutiny because it found
that race was the "overriding, predominant force" used by the state officials in attempting to
comply with the Justice Department. Id. The essence of the "strict scrutiny" test is that the
"State must demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest" in order to justify the use of a suspect classification (in this case race)
to draw district voting lines. Id. at 920. The Supreme Court stated that although a state may
have a significant interest in undoing the effects of past discrinination, that interest does not
become compelling because it attempts to "[comply] with whatever preclearance mandates
the Justice Department issues." Id. at 921-22. Moreover, the Court continued, it is the
function of the judiciary to review whether the State's action is "narrowly tailored," and this
function may not be surrendered to the Justice Department's interpretation of the VRA
because this would place the Executive Branch in the position of determining the
"constitutional limits on race-based official action." Id. at 922.
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district lines, if that maximization is exacted with race being the
dominant factor in achieving such a result, then the plan is
unconstitutional.14 2 As a consequence, Miller holds that a
reapportionment plan that is enacted in such a fashion will not
survive a constitutional challenge; however, a reapportionment plan
that is ameliorative or does not "lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise
of the electoral franchise" will not be denied preclearance. 1 4
In the interim between Bossier Parish I and Bossier Parish II,
the Supreme Court decided Lopez v. Monterey County'" wherein it
considered the issue of whether a covered political subdivision in a
noncovered state must preclear a voting change mandated by the
state legislature. 45 The district court ruled that a covered
jurisdiction "seeks to administer" a voting change, as that term is
used in section 5, when it uses discretion to employ its own policy,
and only then must it seek preclearance.146 However, the Supreme
142. Miller, 515 U.S. at 910-15. This maxim is within the holding of Beer that a plan
"cannot violate section 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis
of race or color as to violate the Constitution." Id. at 923 (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141).
Justice Kennedy explained that a "discriminatory purpose" is more than knowledge of racial
consequences; it implies that officials made their decision, "at least in part," because they
desired the discriminatory effects. Id. at 916 (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979)). It should be noted that this case involved a constitutional challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; thus, the burden of proof is on the
challenging party to sustain the allegations of discriminatory intent violative of the
constitutional standard, whereas in a section 5 case, the burden is on the covered
jurisdiction to show that there is no retrogressive effect and that the plan was not enacted
with a discriminatory purpose. Miller, 515 U.S. at 909, 916, 926.
143. Id. at 924-26. Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's use of strict scrutiny
to review Georgia's reapportionment plan by asserting that the VRA was enacted to aid
minority voters, not to benefit majority voters who already have sufficient political power.
Id. at 947-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
145. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 277-78. Monterey County, California, is a covered jurisdiction
because it was found to have maintained a literacy test "as of November 1, 1968" and less
than "fifty percent of the County's voting age population participated in the 1968 presidential
election." Id. at 271. The State of California is not subject to the VRAs preclearance
requirements. Id. at 269. From 1972 until 1987, Monterey County had enacted numerous
changes in its municipal court system and to the manner in which judges are elected. Id. at
271-73. Out of six consolidation ordinances, the county did not seek section 5 preclearance
for any of them. Id. at 273. Several Hispanic voters of Monterey County brought a suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California in 1991 seeking to enjoin
elections to be held under the consolidation ordinances. Id. at 274. After much litigation, the
State of California in 1995 amended its state constitution and brought about the changes
Monterey County had sought. Id. at 274-77.
146. Id. at 277. The relevant part of section 5 is that preclearance is required
"whenever a [covered] State or political subdivision ... shall enact or seek to administer any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
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Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for the majority, held that
even if a covered jurisdiction exercises no discretion in enacting a
state-mandated voting change, it must still seek preclearance of the
147
proposed change.
Section 5 of the VRA has been quite a controversial piece of
legislation ever since its enactment in 1965. The decision in Bossier
Parish I is certainly not going to put an end to the debate on the
proper role of section 5 preclearance proceedings. However, Justice
Scalia's candid opinion definitely makes clear that it is
retrogression that section 5 is meant to prevent. 148 Construing the
statute in this manner not only correctly defines the relationship
between section 5 preclearance and section 2 constitutionality
claims, but it also solidifies Beer's analysis delineating the
appropriate baseline against which a new voting practice should be
49
measured.1
It cannot be denied that section 5 exacts, as a cost in gaining
minority voting strength, a great price upon the States and political
subdivisions subject to its stricture. Thus, assuming the
constitutionality of the procedure, along with the burden of proof
falling upon the covered jurisdiction, it is only fitting that the
standard for successfully enacting a voting change is that the new
practice does not burden minority voting strength any more than
the one it replaces. In addition, Bossier Parish II makes such an
enactment valid even if the voting change is enacted with a
discriminatory purpose. 15° To hold otherwise would be to risk the
possibility that new voting practices as good as or even better than
those they replace could be denied preclearance if the covered
jurisdiction had to meet the constitutional standard of section 2.
Minority voters, therefore, would be left in the undesirable position
to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968." Id. at 270.
147. Id. at 278. Justice Thomas dissented noting that the Court has repeatedly
recognized section 5's purpose as being a tool to stop certain jurisdictions from "staying one
step ahead of the federal courts." Id. at 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Beer, 425 U.S. at
140; Bossier Parish,520 U.S. at 477). Thus, Justice Thomas asserted that because California
is not a covered jurisdiction, it should not be subject to section 5 of the VRA because it has
never been the " 'perpetrator' that section 5 is designed to thwart." Id. at 291. Because of the
heavy federalism costs that section 5 entails, Justice Thomas believed that it is essential that
section 5 only be applied to remedy the "effects of prior intentional racial discrimination."
Id. at 293-94 (citing Bossier Parish,520 U.S. at 480; Miller, 515 U.S. at 926; Rome, 446 U.S.
at 200 (Powell, J., dissenting); Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 141 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Katzenbach,
383 U.S. at 358-60 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)).
148. Bossier Parish,120 S. Ct. at 878.
149. Id. at 874.
150. Id. at 878.
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of being worse off because of section 5 despite the fact that it was
intended for their benefit. 1 1 Moreover, minority voters are not left
without a remedy as they may still bring a section 2 proceeding if
they feel that the new voting practice violates the Constitution. 152
From Justice Black's dissent in Katzenbach to the majority's
opinion in Bossier Parish II, the Court takes careful note of the
intrusion of the statute into the concept of federalism. Forcing a
state political entity to go begging at the door of the federal
government for permission to administer laws enacted by the duly
elected representatives of the people is no small encroachment.
Yet, despite the criticisms lodged against section 5, the
constitutionality of this extraordinary exercise of Congress' power
has been upheld in every challenge brought against it. Nonetheless,
because of the intrusive nature of this statute into the realm of
state sovereignty, the Court has taken great care to interpret its
boundaries with this intrusion in mind.
Although the Court's opinion in this case furthers the purpose of
the VRA, there are still a couple of areas in section 5 jurisprudence
that fall short of bringing the Act within the proper bounds of the
section 2 enforcement provision of the Fifteenth Amendment. A
political subdivision that has met the "bailout" requirements of the
Act' -' should be able to petition the court for relief from the
requirement of meeting the preclearance criteria regardless of
whether or not the state it is located in has successfully "bailed
out." Additionally, a covered political subdivision that enacts a
voting change mandated by the noncovered state that it is part of
should not be required to seek preclearance. When given the
opportunity to address these issues in future cases, the Court
should consider respecting the good faith of those jurisdictions that
are in compliance with the Act. In this manner, the vital concept of
federalism would not be usurped by congressional enforcement
efforts that exceed constitutional limits, and the political entities
that have not acquiesced would remain subject to the remedial
legislation. Changes such as these would result in less federal
intervention, greater responsiveness of government to the will of
the people, and voting regulations focused on the areas where they
are most needed.
David Harvey
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 875-76.
Id. at 875.
Rome, 446 U.S. at 164 n.2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)).

